Counters to Western Forces so effectively used in 1991 and 2003 have unsurprisingly grown in both number and, more importantly, maturity in the last three decades.
What are the challenges that face the British Army in adapting to maintain its lead?
Posts in this series
Part I: Lenses
This series of articles is ultimately going to look at possible methods for resolving Army challenges by using a number of lenses.
Many of these lenses are connected, and not all challenges are covered in the scope of this series.
In addition I need to warn you about the use of Buzzwords. They will be used however I will endeavour to only use them where a generalised concept is important.
The lenses will take a Red Team point of view of the challenges, and so the tone of the first part of these series of articles may come across as depressing.
This is deliberate: It is desirable to pick holes in ideas, equipment, concepts and attitudes
Let’s tackle the two dire warnings and portents of doom from Wargaming and Training primarily. First the “Frontage” issue.
The Frontage Problem
The 21st Century is currently described by many as the Post-Industrial Era.
British and American Divisions in particular amongst Western militaries, were predominantly defined, constructed, refined and deployed effectively during the Industrial Era.
With modification, how the British and the Americans organise their Army’s today was broadly born about with the 1940 and 1942 formations of the units we are familiar with today.
This Industrial Era thinking dominated the Cold War and our deployments - particularly to Eastern Europe - where a whole British Army Corps (1 BR Corps) was allocated to covering just one single 65km x 150km slice of the Rhine.
For such large numbers of personnel and materiel this is a tiny area in current terms, as the following map illustrates. The relative size of the Area of Operations is marked as a small blue rectangle.
1 BR Corps Area of Operations
Illustrative 65km x 150km rectangle depicted as originating from the Bielefeld region, Germany.
As the complexity of equipment and supporting assets developed, the concept of AirLand battle were developed and refined through to and proven during the Gulf War in 1991 (Perkins, 2014) as means of “controlling the chaos” and supporting a formation’s ability to maintain front.
AirLand Battle, 1986
AirLand Battle organisation for moving to contact as described in the Field Manual FM 100-5, May 1986 (Perkins, 2014).
There are three problems in particular with employing our Industrial Era Divisions and Brigades in a similar manner today:
The first is the UK simply no longer has the mass of people or equipment in order to cover the frontage required using the same CONOPS and equipment;
Secondly, and similar to the first point, we do not have the logistics left to safely move what we do have to the right location and supply them while they are there.
Lastly, our likely enemies in any shooting war have actively developed a range of tactics, structures, personnel and equipment specifically designed to crack through these Industrial Era formations.
“They have watched us and moved on, whilst we have effectively tweaked WW2 concepts over 75 years.”
- Gen. Milley, 2017
The range of opposing doctrine/tactics/equipment, grouped under the general term Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) for convenience, may be buzzword worthy but they do represent real and credible threats to our armed forces if we insist on continuing with our normal jogging.
They are broadly categorised by the use of persistent surveillance to fix the location of targets, which are then annihilated with devastating long-range precision fires. Screening forces are designed to prevent the approach of opposing forces into the areas into which we traditionally dominate a battlefield.
Variants include modernised versions of Glubokaya Operatsiya and Russian Artillery Shock tactics through to more discrete Counterbattery Fire forces capable of Maneuver by Fire within an entire region.
These variants are numerous and it is likely that no single one will likely be employed against a Coalition in isolation.
Anti Access/Area Denial
Illustrative distances of Russian A2AD “bubbles” in Eastern Europe based on conservative S-400, GLCM ranges and march distances sourced from Missile Threat, centred arbitrarily near Crimea, Bolgorod, Kaliningrad, Opochka and St. Petersburg.
In repeated simulations American Armoured Brigade Combat Teams have been defeated when tested under various simulation systems if ABCT’s or IBCT’s were not present in sufficient (i.e. overwhelming) numbers (Macgregor, 2016).
These are overwhelming numbers that NATO now lacks, will find time consuming to generate if at all possible, or can’t afford to lose (more on that later), in particular the UK.
Strongpoint Combat Simulations
Current Divisional structures have been repeatedly defeated by Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) structures using multiple simulation methods (Macgregor, 2016).
The High Intensity Problem
The second dire warning and portent of doom we’ll look at in particular is how combat formations fare in High Intensity warfare.
For the purposes of this series we will define High Intensity warfare as sustained contact with an enemy requiring repeated rotation of forces where the asymmetric combat edge has been lost.
A clear as day definition, right? Good.
Under these conditions, at the National Training Center (NTC) and throughout other Combat Training Centers (CTCs) in the US, it has been reported that the US Army can expect a full ABCT to be rendered combat ineffective after one week (Nance, 2017).
These conclusions have not been drawn from paper/spreadsheet based simulation systems or wargaming, these are large-scale and carefully planned training exercises.
It is noteworthy that the training centre “casualty” rates reported track within an acceptable margin of error with those in Macgregors simulations.
”…based on casualty rates during rotations at the National Training Center (or any CTC), an ABCT — the primary unit [employed] for high-intensity conflict — would be rendered combat ineffective within a week of entering high-intensity combat.”
- Maj. Bill Nance, 2017.
As noted by Major Nance (2017), Armoured groups suffer from attrition to expensive and long-lead equipment that is difficult and costly to replace. Nance also notes that Infantry and, to a lesser extent, Stryker groups (having similarities to, but not identical with, what the British MIV program is trying to achieve) suffers far higher casualty rates compared to an ABCT which overshadows the easier to replace equipment.
Littoral Urban Sprawls
High-Intensity battles are more likely to, though not exclusively, take place in urbanised sprawls. Littoral urban environments - coastal megacities for example - are both the most complex and the fastest growing of urbanised areas globally, magnifying the challenges faced by any Army.
Back in the UK the means to recover these expended forces - personnel or equipment - is not extensive at the moment.
There is little materiel in reserve. For example, instead of delivering a new Main Battle Tank to the UK’s Armoured Brigades with Challenger 2’s being placed into storage for a rainy day or for Army Reserve units to field, the Challenger 2 Life Extension Program is delivering only just enough tanks for a couple of frontline Regiments (~US Battalions) at best.
While the British economy is performing better than was predicted at the beginning of 2017 budgets remain tight. Mistakes were made at the MOD by banking on efficiencies (Tip: Don’t do this) that unsurprisingly haven’t materialised. Defence - despite a recent surge of interest in the press - still ranks lower on most political radars on the British and Irish Archipelago.
British medical care for casualties is definitely top-tier globally. There is still so much, much more we can do to pull our wounded out (regardless of ailment) and help them recover.
Finally, recruitment of new personnel remains a challenge in the UK.
Why this comes as a surprise to many is beyond me. The MOD operates equipment that potential recruits hear their grandparents actually operated, personnel are under constant threat of being sacked (I’m not going to use a military term for it because it is what it is), veterans are being witch hunted, the MOD could do more to help those who move into civilian life, and there’s little in the way of long-term programs attracting youth into a multi-decade career in the first place.
The Army sometimes needs to provide more than just a sense of duty. mate-ship or self-fulfillment to attract the best, in numbers.
The Myth of Mobilisation
When the bullets start flying… in a shooting war… when the Russians drive over the Northern Plains… all bets are off… we’ll engage in Total War… we’ll mobilise the entire nation and the economy… turning our mighty industry to forging our plowshares back into swords… just like in WWII…
But is that really the case?
The strategic environment has changed and while there are strong lessons to be retained, much is different. There is a very strong belief that we will not see Total War again while Nuclear Weapons, in particular the strategic deterrent forms, can continue constraint the flow of conflicts in that direction.
It is this constraint, together with the nature of new-warfare, that Macgregor (2018) based his advice to a new crop of Military Leaders and Managers in February of this year:
“Historically we have viewed the Regular Army as this ‘Core’ around which larger forces would inevitably be built. Ladies and Gentlemen, that is an unrealistic expectation now. That force… at the beginning of unanticipated or anticipated crisis and conflicts is the force that will be decisive in most cases. The reason for that is very simple: Nuclear Weapons have eliminated Total War. But Nuclear Weapons have not necessarily eliminated War.”
- Col. (Ret) Macgregor, 2018
Reserves are not the legions of Infantry that will be raised to march to our Regular Army’s rescue. They will be able to reinforce, occasionally replace, and bolster the skills of the Core in the existing, Regular Army.
Our equipment is complex, expensive and time consuming to produce and train to fight.
The force we have at the beginning of a conflict, is the force that will be decisive in most cases.
The Identity Problem
The British Army has a problem defining itself.
Not in terms of understanding itself, although some readers may think otherwise, but in terms of explaining themselves and what they do quickly and succinctly to others outside of the Army.
Compared to its sibling Services, the Army frequently finds itself forced to reach for a set of PowerPoint slides in order to describe how it is organised, how it fights, why it needs another armoured vehicle when it’s just received approval for the last one…
The average member of the public or politician may recognise a soldier or a main battle tank, they may even have an idea of what they do individually in addition to a preconception about what “boots on the ground” may mean.
However in practice there is a lack of appreciation amongst these important audiences that these are only components within an fighting structure and it is that structure which achieves the effect through combination once it is in a theatre.
By choosing to discuss themselves at this level of minute detail, the Army opens itself up to two easily avoided problems for itself:
The first is that if you talk about tens of thousands of units (personnel, not-a-tanks, etc), it sounds to a layperson as if we have plenty of numbers. 80,000 is a large number to most people who are used to seeing 11-a-side football squads or a movie with a fire team in “standard two by two cover formation”. It can really take a whole PowerPoint presentation to explain why we do not have plenty. It is not a quick “elevator pitch” or pub/coffee chat to correct that mistaken view. Contrast the messages “We only have eighty thousand soldiers now” to “We’re at risk of only having a handful of Brigades left” or “We’re down to two Divisions”.
The second is by choosing to discuss at the level of the soldier or the tank, that’s the level of detail that will be latched onto by less-informed stakeholders when support for the overall warfare capable organisation is more important. Committees will be set up to discuss tanks and the valuable politician time spent at the wrong level of detail. We discuss the soldier or the tank, not what we need to achieve, what is required to have that effect and how we plan to do it.
Challengers and Warriors, or a Mechanised Battalion?
The British Army rarely discusses concepts, operations, solutions, personnel, equipment or logistics in terms of the whole formations it actually fights with, instead focusing on single vehicle classes or individual soldier stories
The Army’s sibling Services do not seem to experience this problem, at least not to the same degree.
They describe themselves in terms of a whole Frigate, a whole Squadron, an Airbase or Carrier Group as the basic “unit of effect”. The public and politicians (and media!) seem to accept this and do not often question the myriad of components that make up these capabilities to the same degree: Air defence, ships boats, resupply vessels, organic helicopters, etc.
These are all accepted as part of a fighting unit.
Why does the Army allow itself to be discussed, and often defeated, in detail?
Royal Navy carrier Group
The Royal Navy typically discusses itself in terms of vessels, either operating alone or in groups. The collection of hundreds of personnel, multiple departments and integrated systems and supporting vessels comprising these units are broadly accepted as assumed by the public and politicians.
The British are not alone with this problem, the effect is simultaneously magnified and obfuscated in both the US Army and US Marine Corps (Brown, 2017).
The Spectrum Problem
To Full-Spectrum or Not to Full-Spectrum. That is the question.
In his excellent series of books detailing the technological history and drivers of the Royal Navy, D.K. Brown (2011) covers comprehensively that even the Senior Service has traditionally taken the approach of remaining deliberately multi-spectrum, tracking and understanding the latest full-spectrum trends and cutting-edge technology, but only adopting the bleeding edge or leaping ahead with a “Warrior” or a “Dreadnought” when it is clear that it is desirable to self-disrupt their own capabilities and control the pace.
Two methods (Christensen, 2016) apply directly here:
The first is disruptive innovation, specifically self-disruption as demonstrated by the Royal Navy with HMS Dreadnought in 1906. New technologies or methods can cause large, established, organisations to fail unexpectedly if they are unable to match the innovation or are not structured to recognise the opportunity and employ it.
It is better then, to pursue disruptive technologies yourself, and introduce them in a controlled manner at a time that you expect, even if the conditions are not ideal.
The second is that organisations find it extremely difficult, albeit not impossible, to transform themselves from within. It is better then for an organisation to form an organisation external to its main core to innovate disruptive technology and develop the appropriate processes, then transfer resource from the old core to the new core. This model in an altered form is being pursued by US Congress by forming the Multi-Domain Task Force externally to the US Army in order to transform the way the US Army is organised and fights (US GPO, 2017).
The danger of not transforming an organisation to adopt a disruptive innovation if it is not already suited is well detailed by Henderson (2015) who cites a lack of correct architecture, or ability to change their organisational structure, as the reasons for the failure of organisations such as Xerox and Sony to employ disruptive innovations even though they had recognised them.
When discussing adding and removing spectra of capabilities from the British Army we must always bear in mind whether the British Army is able to adopt disruptive innovations as-is and whether it is capable of altering it’s organisation to adopt them otherwise.
Full-Spectrum capability has never been natural state for the British Armed Forces even at the height of our powers.
The British Armed Forces at their most successful were Multi-Spectrum, only becoming Full-Spectrum during High-Intensity conflicts such as WWII and sustained during the Low-Intensity conflict of the Cold War. Even then it could be argued there were capabilities that Britain chose not to pursue for a variety of reasons including resource.
The Tizard Mission (Baxter III, 1946) has been argued as evidence of this: Desirable technologies that could change the direction of WWII but that Britain chose not to develop as a priority, instead pitching them to an Ally in the hope they can find a sponsor and make a difference via that route instead.
The Cold War has distorted our view, preventing us from “standing down” in a controlled fashion after WWII and returning to what is commonly perceived to be a more controlled and sensible rhythm of capability development.
With a small Army far below the resources of the Royal Navy at its height, with aging equipment, absent political will and… uncertain… budgets, how does an Armed Service hope to engage in the Full-Spectrum of High-Intensity warfare including AirLand Battles, COIN operations, Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR), UN sponsored peacetime security missions, Air Assault, Amphibious Assault, Port Access and Clearance, Port Capture, Ballistic Missile Defence, Strategic support of NATO defence, Cyber and Electronic Warfare, Air Defence…
You get the picture.
The Ministry of Defence (2017) has begun to shift its rhetoric in this direction primarily via their Strategic Trends Program publications with a subtle shift from the Full-Spectrum term used in the past to use “across the-”, “ broad-” and “whole-” spectrum instead in their Future Operating Environments 2035 piece.
This is an interesting if subtle move in language, however there is no corresponding (public) release on how the Industrial Era Army construct we are used to should move towards this reduced scope - but world-class - Multi-Spectrum capability.
Christensen (2016) is widely accepted as correct in his approach to changing an organisation: That change is most successfully implemented when it comes from outside of the organisation to be changed. Congress has accepted this and formed in law the Multi-Domain Task Force to determine if a new fighting structure will be effective for the US Army and to implement the model if so.
There is no such external body in the UK.
It is difficult for those outside of the MOD organisation to offer educated planning recommendations without being given an indication of what the Government and MOD’s approaches are to Defence.
It is commonly levelled at the non-serving Defence community that they are not in possession of all of the facts. And nor should they be. Nor will all of the layers even within the MOD and Services.
But lacking are important public policy details on whether the UK expects to rely on assistance with Sovereign Defence outside of the Article 6 definition?
What is the position on defence of Sovereign Territory during disagreements between NATO members?
Is there to be broader support for Commonwealth Realm and Nation support?
What roles does the Government see as acceptable use of “boots on the ground”? High-Intensity warfare? Seek and Destroy? COIN? Peacekeeping? Support and intervention? What forms are these to take?
Are British Service Personnel expected to be able to relax with a brew/wet without requiring Allied/Coalition support?
The Deployment Problem
If taking action when you are in-theatre is a hard nut to crack, getting into the theatre and sustaining you while there increases your challenge by at least a factor.
Do you have forces in theatre already?
Is there an adjoining friendly state where you have units already deployed?
Is there a friendly port or airstrip neighbouring the theatre that you can land and transport from? Are there railheads, road infrastructure? What’s the expected width of transport lanes? What are the choke points? What weight classification are the roads and bridges in the area? How close together do the local trees typically grow?
How much security do you need to provide to your transport and logistics train?
Can you insert small groups of forces discreetly?
Do you need to land on a beach? Can you locate one for an unopposed landing or are you expecting a Normandy Landing?
Can your assault fleet approach the coast safely? How far from shore do you need to stand off? How quick are your landing craft? How long is the landing craft rotation based on this speed, distance and current/tide/sea-state? Can you build up a critical mass of forces in sufficient time?
Do you need to seize a port? Are you able to clear the port of belligerents and denial systems such as channel mines or improvised explosive devices? Can you refloat block ships and repair the facilities?
Are you prepared for landing an amphibious force directly into an urban sprawl where a High-Intensity battle can be immediately expected?
Do you need to create a port? Can you create a port?
Do you need to seize an airfield? Are you able to prepare an air strip? Is an air strip sufficient?
How are you bringing in your fuel, food, ammunition, medical supplies, casualty evacuation…
Tip of the iceberg stuff and usually the point at which someone rolls out one of those cheesy logistics quotes:
“Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics.”
- Gen. Robert H. Barrow, USMC COMDT, 1980
That’s the one!
The UK is blessed with what is widely considered the best-in-class Mine Countermeasure and Explosive Ordnance Disposal units on land or at sea in the world.
Britain also has a surprising amount of sea lift available, taking in relation to the size of the Armed Forces and Navy, although a considerable amount of this sea lift requires escort and isn’t of the type that you would perform an initial D-Day landing with..
As with all world-class capabilities however, numbers are considered insufficient, the dedicated Amphibious Assault Ships are under threat of early disposal if there is a force that can be landed amphibiously in order to justify themselves, MCM vessels have already been cut to redirect personnel to man the additional OPV’s required for UK, NI, Crown Dependency and British Overseas EEZ control, budgets are tight…
In addition, despite having outstanding quality, the UK is not blessed with quantities of air lift or ground transportation. The A400M can be considered a C-17 that sheds a little capacity in order to be able to operate like a C-130, which is a phenomenal airlift capability. If only the UK had double the number and the ground assets that could take advantage of it.
Similarly, Britain prizes heavy (in terms of armour protection levels) tracked vehicles but has an amazing shortfall of Heavy Equipment Transporter style vehicles or equivalents to the low-loader trailers (pulled by SV/HX style vehicles) that the US are using to bolster their own stocks of transports.
By the time a Challenger 2 Regiment has dragged itself into theatre, the action may be over, or the Main Battle Tanks will be scattered over several hundred kilometers refitting thrown tracks and attempting to loosen the torsion just to access other chassis components.
Once in-theatre, deploying and re-deploying carries a particular danger with our Industrial Era constructs.
Hoffman and Holoye (2017) report that there is an alarming tendency amongst NATO commanders to group their command posts, support and logistics nodes together in nice, detectable, grouped together and vulnerable spots.
While I do not believe that this is unique to NATO commanders, the propensity of intelligent, trained and (often) experienced commanders doing this points to underlying issues preventing the kind of dispersal and manoeuvre of these assets that are required to avoid the bog voiny (“God of War”) field artillery, Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) and “Short” Range ballistic Missiles (SRBM) that Russia has used to devastating effect in Ukraine and that China is rapidly developing.
Make no mistake, NATO commanders are skilled. It is not just a mentality for dispersal of these C2/3/4/ISR and supply nodes that needs to be reinforced, but the easy means to achieve dispersed command and supply is lacking. This is leading to the temptation, subconsciously or even if made consciously under a balance of risk, to lump together for efficiency, not survivability.
Joint Multinational Readiness Center
“...standard operating procedures for logistical-support units frequently result in geographic concentrations of command-and-control and support elements, demonstrated in this June 2017 photo from the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC)” - Hoffman and Holoye (2017).
The Cyber Problem
During a Congress Subcommittee meeting on Defense (spelled with an ’s’), a very succinct question was asked by Senator King:
“What happens when the wires are cut?”
- Senator A. King
The context was Cyber Warfare.
Amongst the usual throwaway lines and another Senator asking questions clearly aimed at securing more funding for pet Cyber and Electronic Warfare (EW) projects (none of which exist or are close to ”proven”), this simple question cut to the root of the impact of Cyber Warfare on the battlefield:
It’s a Command and Control (C2) issue.
The focus in Cyber Warfare is degrade “their” C2 while preserving yours and is not limited to hacking, jamming or complex social media. It can include physical attacks on your electronic infrastructure.
“Six accurate [OPFOR] fire missions caused ripples throughout the brigade and degraded its operational reach for hours.”
- Captains Hoffman and Holoye, 2017
What do you do when these “wires” are cut either electronically, physically or via disinformation campaigns (what we used to call #fakenews back in the day…).
It’s telling that a frequent pickup reading press-releases from officer exchange programs between NATO members is that units have become so reliant on technology that basic soldiering skills are having to be re-taught (Burke, 2015).
“[Royal Marines] have different experiences; they’re more focused on their actual soldiering and not so much getting all wrapped up in technology.”
- Sgt. Christopher Sevigny, 2015.
This is not limited to the [British/US] Army or Marines either, with news that the US Navy has started teaching celestial navigation again (Subcommittee on AirLand, 2017).
Hold up: Started teaching, again?! When did they stop teaching it?!
Do we have the skills to survive on a battlefield without our Western Technology? Are we too reliant on our Offset Technology? Have we allowed our skills and basic equipment to languish? Do we know when we can or can’t emit (or when not to geotag smart phone pictures or upload our jogging habits…).
The Divisional Paradox
Britain has been engaged in COIN operations, stabilisation and interventions for almost 20 years since its last conventional warfare engagement.
This, combined with an analysis of needs, defined Brigade level forces in the SDSR 2010 as the ideal size for the British Army (HMG, 2010), which also likely appealed to HMT on the basis of cost too. A Brigade is obviously cheaper than a Division, right?
Shift to the SDSR 2015 and the Joint Force 2025 document is now detailing a firm need for a “Warfighting Division optimised for High-Intensity combat” (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2017).
This jarring shift clashes with the programs and initiatives (and lack of) set up following the SDSR 2010.
The British Division being proposed comprised of a fraction of the Brigades defined by our NATO Allies.
There are fewer armoured vehicles in a Regiment (a British Armoured Battalion) and the exact piece of equipment British personnel are expected to use genuinely may have been operated by that person’s grandparent in a previous conflict.
Infantry Brigades are smaller, manoeuvre options reduced and there are limited programs to increase protected mobility.
Logistics and supporting Corps have been reduced, outsourced with “PFI’s and C-Fleets” and opportunities to consolidate equipment fleets not taken over the years.
How can the UK deploy an effective “Warfighting Division” with these ongoing reductions?
How can a reduced effectiveness Division generate an ABCT equivalent force on the Battlefield?
How can a British equivalent ABCT or IBCT hope to counter A2AD threats amongst the challenges noted above if a “stronger” US ABCT will struggle to cope?
How does the British Army hope to persist in-theatre, rotating and replacing Brigades expended at the rate of 1 per week (or faster if the Brigades are “weakened”)?
How can the UK deploy Brigade level forces for her own needs when those Brigades are called upon to form a “Warfighting Division”?
How can Brigades, Divisions or generated BCT from these “Warfighting Division” equivalents deploy at short notice, at range from their bases in the UK and sustain themselves for the necessary amount of time when the support Corps and Vessels are under threat of the axe?
Commentators admire and support the British military, however it’s difficult to see how the Army can rise to these challenges if they are forced to continue with this Normal Jogging.
How can we help them? Recall that Christensen (2016) has long claimed that successful self-disruption of an organisation needs to come from a part that is separate to the normal business of that organisation. If you want to break out of Normal Jogging, section of a separate part of yourself to develop a new way of operating, then transition to it.
Which leads us on to…
The Positive News
Remember the good news throughout all of this:
The British Army is small enough to engage in organisational change and selected equipment recapitalisation that could deliver a highly capable and credible land force resolving a majority of the above problems without breaking the bank or taking an age to achieve.
The next part in this series will begin to use these lenses to distill possible UK requirements to solve a number of these problems.
Please stand by…
Posts in this series
Baxter III, J. P. (1946). Scientists Against Time. Little, Brown, and Co.
Brown, D. K. (2011). Warrior to Dreadnought: Warship Development, 1860-1905. Naval Institute Press.
Brown, G. (2017). The Army’s Identity Crisis. Retrieved from https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Winter_2016-17/4_Brown.pdf
Burke, M. M. (2015). British Royal Marine first to embed with US Marines in new program. Retrieved from https://www.stripes.com/news/british-royal-marine-first-to-embed-with-us-marines-in-new-program-1.363356
Carter, N. Gen. Sir. (2017). RUSI Land Warfare Conference Chief of the General Staff’s Keynote 2017. Retrieved from https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20170628-rusi_lwc17-cgs_keynote.pdf
Christensen, C. M. (2016). The Innovator’s Dilemma. Harvard Business Review Press.
Deptula, D. Lt. Gen, USAF (Ret). (2017). The Future of All Arms Warfare in the 21st Century. Retrieved from https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Deptula_03-15-17.pdf
Henderson, R. (2015). Leading Sustainable Change: An Organizational Perspective. Oxford University Press.
Her Majesty’s Government. (2010). Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62482/strategic-defence-security-review.pdf
Hoffman, J. Capt. and Holoye, P. Capt. (2017). Logistical Operations in Highly Lethal Environments. Retrieved from http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/Logistical-Operations-in-Highly-Lethal-Environments.pdf
House of Commons Defence Committee (2017). SDSR 2015 and the Army. Retrieved from https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmdfence/108/108.pdf
Macgregor, D. Col (Ret). (2016). A Competitive Performance Analysis: Current and Alternative Force Designs against Russian Forces. Retrieved from http://www.douglasmacgregor.com/RSGSASCBRIEFFINALshow.ppsx
Macgregor, D. Col (Ret). (2017). Information Briefing on the Reconnaissance Strike Group (RSG). Retrieved from http://douglasmacgregor.com/rsgupdated12052017.pdf
Macgregor, D. Col (Ret). (2018). Mission Command in the 21st Century Army. Video retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zcoy6sm03Fc
Ministry of Defence. (2017). Future Operating Environment 2035. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/future-operating-environment-2035
Nance, B. Maj. (2017). The US Army’s High-Intensity Problem. Retrieved from https://mwi.usma.edu/us-armys-high-intensity-problem/
Perkins, D. G. Gen. (2014). Army Operating Concept and Force 2025 & Beyond. Retrieved from http://slideplayer.com/slide/5256507/
Think Defence Blog. (2017). Towards #SDSR18. Retrieved from http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/breaking-cycle-perpetual-crisis-mod/
United States Government Publishing Office. (2017). Calendar No. 469 114TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION S. 2943 [Report No. 114–255]. Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/s2943/BILLS-114s2943pcs.pdf
United States Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on AirLand. (2017). All Arms Warfare in the 21st Century. Video retrieved from https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/17-03-15-all-arms-warfare-in-the-21st-century