“Industrial Era” combat formations, developed in 1940-1942 and refined throughout 1992-2003, are no longer sufficient.
The British Army needs to form a “Post-Industrial Era” fighting organisation.
Posts in this series
Part II: Needs
In Part I: Lenses we looked at a select number of key areas of issues for the British Army
Following true Red Team tradition (Mulvaney, 2012) the issues were presented in a tear down manner to pick apart and blow holes in current thinking. Now we start picking up these pieces and look to make a stronger organisation to not just face the future, but grab it by the throat.
The intention is to define an achievable end result, the level of change manageable within a 5-10 year plan of restructuring and recapitalisation of the Army in order to continue providing it with the recruitment, retention, resources and respect it has earned by protecting our freedoms in blood every time we have had to call upon its members.
In Part I we looked at the various challenges facing the British Army in a world where its Industrial Era fighting organisation, relatively unchanged since 1940-1942, has lost its lead in combat effectiveness.
In summary these challenges are:
The Identity Problem: Where the Army allows itself to be discussed, and often defeated, in detail while sibling and allied Services succeed in conveying their importance more succinctly via the use of larger units of measurement such as an Armored [sic] Brigade Combat Team, Carrier Groups, Typhoon Squadrons or Frigates;
The Divisional Paradox: Where self-sufficient Brigades have been identified as the most suitable formation size for sovereign defence/recapture, expeditionary warfare and supporting the Commonwealth Realm, whilst a deployable and sustainable “Warfighting Division” has been requested of Britain by NATO, and the USA in particular;
The Frontage Problem: Where the mass of our Army and the mobility of its methods and equipment are no longer sufficient to maintain a front line in an Era of long range lethality, new-warfare and mobile opponents;
The High Intensity Problem: Where proven high rates of attrition of people and materiel mean both the protection levels surrounding our personnel and equipment, and the ease of recycling damaged and wounded people and equipment either within the field, in theatre or evacuated home back into action, have come into a sharp focus;
The Myth of Mobilisation: Where we realise that the core of the Army that we have now is what we will realistically have to resolve a conflict, that Reserves will only Reinforce and Replace what we have in the field rather than forming a huge body of troops, and that Nuclear Weapons have rendered true Total War extremely unlikely;
The Spectrum Problem: Where we learn that Full-Spectrum capability is not a natural state for the British Armed Forces - even at the peak of global influence - and that we must focus on a Multi-Spectrum of world-class capability or risk spreading ourselves so thin that many capabilities become irrelevant due to lack of mass;
The Deployment Problem: Where the hardships of deploying and sustaining are exacerbated by increasing the distances to theatres, enlarging the manoeuvre areas and a reduction in the security of supply trains now there is no longer a “safe rear area”;
The Cyber Problem: Where all of the hacking, jamming and disabling boils down to Command and Control, and that our tendency to bunch up both C2 and Supply nodes together with a restrictive command structure and lack of quickly mobile Command and Logistics fleets opens us up to being paralised for hours on end, even by conventional attacks.
Let us begin to tackle these challenges by opening up debate on what needs we require a solution to.
The British Army’s Identity has a core problem that requires only a small but very achievable change that will have a huge effect:
Talk in Formations.
The Army needs to decide what that unit of measurement for Warfighting is and stick to it.
For example, Brigades.
It needs to convey quickly and succinctly that these Formations - just like a warship or surface group (Subcommittee on AirLand, 2017) - require suites of weapons and systems appropriate to their purpose: Air defences, repair shops and medical bays, a supply train, command posts. Homes where their personnel, families, communities and supporting industries are loosely positioned when not deployed.
The Army needs the language, the terminology, the media-friendly jargon to clearly convey to the nation how many of these Formations it has, what they are used for, how many it needs, how many of these Formations would have to be “decommissioned” if cuts are imposed and the impact that this would have for the Nation and local areas alike.
It must educate the nation to recognise that when a named Formation has been deployed that this is a credible warfighting unit with a range of capabilities deployed for a recognisable purpose.
That when we deploy several such formations in a larger group, that it is implicit that heavy fighting is expected. A layperson recogises that a Royal Navy Frigate is capable, even if they do not fully understand. That same layperson recognises that when the Frigate has joined a Carrier Group, that Frigate is part of a more serious whole.
Lifting the level of discussion to warfighting formations will allow the Army to counter its regular political defeat in detail, regain the initiative in its equipment programs and generate more support and understanding amongst civilians.
The Army needs this shift in order to move debate away from units of measurement such as 82,000 soldiers, 2,747 JLTV or £6M per Ajax - figures that immediately invite temptation to salami slice based on the misunderstanding that it will have a minor impact - and instead move towards talking in terms of having enough formations to perform what is being asked of them.
Like a Warship, the Army fights and wins in Formations themselves comprised of multiple parts that rely on each other. It does not fight and win based on a single armoured vehicle project or a diversity program. These are just small parts of making the whole an effective fighting force. 1\34 ABCT (US Army) pictured.
The reduction in mass of the British Army itself reduces its ability to prevent enemy manoeuvre around or penetration of the fronts.
Combined with development of the various Anti-Area Access Denial (A2AD), hybrid and asymmetric approaches designed to specifically identify, and destroy traditional Industrial Era Western AirLand fronts means that the Army will find itself required to defend itself from all directions in future (Macgregor, 2016 and 2017. Deptula, 2017. Scharre, 2017. Subcommittee on AirLand, 2017. Ministry of Defence, 2017).
Illustrative distances of possible Russian A2AD “bubbles” in Eastern Europe based on conservative S-400, GLCM ranges and march distances, centred arbitrarily on Crimea, Bolgorod, Kaliningrad, Opochka and St. Petersburg.
To handle this the Army requires a formation and command structure that is able to detect and respond to threats in an area around it, without a defined front.
The formation must be able to manoeuvre rapidly. This refers to “Speed Factor” and is not a Top Trumps top speed indicator. Although dash speed of individual vehicles can be important, a formations ability to manoeuvre together, covering greater distance in less time while still fighting. It is the ability of the formation to pack up, move quickly, across terrain and gaps, dealing with obstacles, de-bus nimbly while fighting and protecting itself throughout.
Critically it must be capable of moving with a few moments notice, preferably in less than 8-15 minutes (Wavell Room, 2017), of detecting a threat. It must be able to do this whether completely self-supporting or under the cover of cooperatively-supporting elements.
The formation must be able to self-sustain its manoeuvre, it cannot rely on traditional logistics with no rearward safe area. Last mile logistics from organic supply elements moving as a part of the Formation becomes critical (Think Defence Blog, 2017) and self-carriage of sufficient fuel and supplies to sustain a fight while resupply is coordinated is required.
Finally the formation needs to be an all-arms formation (McMaster, 2014), containing the tools required to engage all threats it is likely to encounter. This is not to be a formation that hides from A2AD bubbles or “heavier” vehicles: It must manoeuvre within an A2AD bubble at will, will be formidably protected, able to detect and destroy the enemy that it encounters either at the moment of opportunity or one of its choosing.
Researching A2AD, All-Arms and Multi-Domain battle throws up a gamut of buzzwords, however it’s important to cut through the marketing and review the evidence of the underlying threats: Your enemy has not been standing still since 1991 or even 2003, they have been employing and maturing their doctrine since at least 2010 (conservative) and their equipment and strategies are specifically designed to defeat you.
A2AD environments and High Intensity battles are designed to be utterly lethal to humans. They chew up matériel at a rate faster than we produce these complex (as opposed to complicated) and expensive machines.
As a result, the Army needs a formation that is equipped with armoured and protected vehicles in sufficient volume and operated in an appropriate manner to allow personnel to survive.
This is not a zero-tolerance to casualties policy, but the cold acknowledgement that to keep our combat formations combat effective for the duration necessary and to reduce the time required to recycle them back into combat in rotation in a fit state to be maintain our high level of combat effectiveness we need to keep our personnel as intact - in all respects - as possible.
Similarly, the equipment must be designed to be rapidly repairable in field or recycled back to it. Modular armour packs, common engines and drives trains, reduced repair times in the field and at depot and a shortened time to vehicle recovery.
Armour and nearby Protection, immediately accessible and able to be on the move in under 8-15 minutes, must become the norm for personnel operating in lethal environments. It is believed that this is the region of time from sensor acquisition to impact from mass fires in an A2AD environment (Wavell Room, 2017).
In particular formations need to push the boundaries of the combat effectiveness duration set by the likes of Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCT) to remain effective in the field (Nance, 2017). They need to endure long enough to allow reinforcements, regeneration of forces through rotation and the mobilisation of Reserves if necessary.
The formation also needs to manoeuvre with significant medical and repair facilities to remain in the field, and be able to rotate casualties, damaged equipment, replacements and reinforcements through to the combat areas.
Soft-skinned, open and unprotected vehicles must be avoided in these “ship of the line” formations the Army needs to shift towards.
This is due to the strong opinions referenced above of there no longer being a defined front and no safer “rear area” for these vehicles to operate in.
“In 1943 Maj. Gen. Ernest Harmon reported we could follow the movement of our recon units by the destroyed Jeeps and American dead along the road. He told Gen. Marshall, ‘The reason is the Germans recon in force with tanks in the lead…’”.
- Col. D. Macgregor, 2017.
We are used to using mobility and situational awareness, not just as a mode of protection but the mode of protection, however As the equipment and their operators are more likely to be rendered combat ineffective and less likely to return to field quickly, their use must be seriously considered for specific or enabling use by specialised operators only.
“In Najaf, two battalions of the Army’s tanks did what a lighter but more numerous Marine force could not, inflicting huge casualties on Mr. Sadr’s insurgents while taking almost none of their own.”
- Alex Berenson, The New York Times, 29 August 2004.
Tactical Golf Carts
Serious consideration needs to be made on the use and method of use of unprotected light infantry and soft/open/unprotected vehicles in High Intensity or A2AD environments where everything is designed to be lethal to the human body from every direction. Including those bodies that belong to members of the Special Forces.
Similarly such portee and limbered equipment that exposes operators and takes longer a few short minutes to unpack, engage, pack up and move should be avoided and phased out.
Crew served artillery
Even dependable, effective systems that expose their operators and/or take time to pack up and move should not be used in the desired formations moving forward and instead only their use by specialised forces where careful consideration of the likely opposition has been performed. Photo By Mike Weston ABIPP/MOD, OGL, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=26920420
With regards to replenishing forces through recruitment, there is no secret voodoo or politically correct campaigns required here. If the Army wants to meet its recruitment and retention targets it needs to achieve the following:
- Provide credible equipment, regularly refreshed, for recruits to want to use and trust;
- Stick up for their personnel when the proverbial hits the fan;
- Provide reasonable housing;
- Offer a respectable remuneration package;
- Engage with education and industry to provide further career/skills development;
- Show the country what the Army does and how it does it, warts and all.
The rest will follow.
Out of scope of this series of articles, but that must be noted, is the heavy importance of long term medical and rehabilitation care, with the intention of supporting personnel in returning to service.
Related to the issue of Identity and the Myth of Mobilisation, Brown (2017) notes that even the US Army with its vast resources is suffering badly from trying to be all things to everyone.
“Instead of preparing inadequately for every war, the [US] Army needs to focus on a specific skill set and hone it to a sharp edge.”
- G. Brown, 2017
The British Army has nowhere near the resources of their American cousins and also must serve a nation that requires a different balance of Defence forces compared to the USA. Even the US Army considers itself to be small these days (Macgregor, 2018)!
To steal a quote from Brown, the Army must focus on specific skill sets and hone them to a sharp edge.
This will enable the Army to deliver credible, formidable, capability, with less budget. It does not preclude the maintenance and pursuit of Full-Spectrum skills when needed as we will cover shortly.
The balance of risk is that, when direct defence of sovereign territory is not being performed, the Army is highly unlikely to be holding territory alone.
The Army is far more likely to be joining Allied local forces who are motivated in the defence of their home.
In addition, the Army is highly likely to be fighting alongside local Allies. Almost all of our Allies have direct requirements to maintain forces that can dig in and hold their own ground in defence of their own sovereign territory.
In the unlikely event that the British Army finds itself defending the British and Irish Archipelago, we will be deep into the Myth of Mobilisation and looking at a Nuclear situation (or Ghost War scenario…).
If the British Army is defending sovereign territory outside of the Archipelago - and given the genuine instability surrounding most of the British Overseas Territories at the moment - the Army cannot become complacent. They are most likely to be retaking territory from or seeking and destroying incoming enemy forces.
Warrior IFV on Exercise
The British Army is most likely to fight next alongside supporting friendly local forces, with our Allies in coalition, or unilaterally in defence of sovereign territory where Allies are less likely to be able to assist directly.
Which Spectra should the Army focus on?
Combined with the Frontage problem, where static positions will be rapidly targeted within 8-15 minutes (Wavell Room, 2017), and the requirement for highly mobile formations, the core of the Army should drop any focus on holding terrain.
Instead, the main focus of the Army should be built upon three, still broad, portions of the spectra:
- Seek and Destroy the enemy;
- Deploy and Sustain Presence to conflict areas to deter and prevent escalation;
- Train and Support local allies to promote stability and security.
Seek and Destroy the enemy.
Seek and Destroy
Seek and Destroy. The Armed Services have developed first rate ISTAR and precision weaponry. They should be unshackled to hone this capability further.
The main formations required must directly address the first two Objectives which comprise a narrower spectrum than the Army currently maintains capability to perform.
The requirements covered so far describe a formation that is tuned for the detection and destruction of a peer force from within the enemies area of operation if necessary. Given the all-arms requirement, this mission is intended to meet the appropriate scale down from full peer conflict, through near-peer to asymmetric warfare.
The formations are intended to be manoeuvrable, self-contained until resupply and cover a much larger area of geography. This necessitates requirements in how we perform C2 and C4ISR to coordinate (more on this below).
Deploy and Sustain to deter and prevent.
Deter and Prevent
Given the requirements listed, the formations that meet these requirements should also be able to reach areas for deterrent or intervention purposes against a range of belligerents.
If we have done our job right in putting together a fighting formation that can deploy quickly at range, sustain indefinitely and engage a peer army, with these attributes rapid deployment to conflict areas globally to provide a deterrent or intervene for peacekeeping missions will be well within the formations capabilities.
Let’s face it, if a Brigade that is designed to decisively defeat peer-level A2AD, Hybrid and Asymmetric forces suddenly arrived on your doorstep, you would think twice about what you were doing…
Train and Support local allies.
Train and Support
Britain has a long tradition of supporting and trusting local Allies alongside us. We forgot this during the 2003 Iraq and early Afghanistan conflicts.
To support the third objective and free the bulk of the Army to focus on developing this narrower multi-spectrum capability to utterly lethal levels, two supporting approaches need to be taken.
These supporting approaches will allow the Army to both preserve skills and continue to keep pace with and develop skills we are not currently focused in.
As mentioned in Part I, this strategy has been highly successful for centuries: Britain keeps pace with the cutting edge, fielding reliable knowns, reintroducing capabilities when they are needed, and self-disrupting its own forces when its own R&D achieves a breakthrough.
The first approach is in developing and expanding the Special Infantry Brigade (SIB) to include the continued development of terrain holding methods and technology with the intention to train local forces and Allies in these skills.
Secondly, the Army Reserve will work with the SIB to provide a consolidation force alongside the reinforcement of the Regular Army.
In this manner, the Army is free to achieve the next level of ISTAR-enabled Destruction of the Enemy while placing skills not currently required as a high priority in an “Active Seedcorn” state within itself for continued development, rather than mothballing and losing these capabilities.
Tanks on a Train
Getting to a place - presence or “being there” - has proven critical in numerous British deployments over the last three decades.
The Think Defence Blog (2016) ably sums up the importance of Deployment as “The conclusions drawn [on reflections in operations in the Balkans] were, if you want to have an effect, you have to be there.”
“No matter what capabilities you have, they do not form part of your deterrence unless you can deploy, sustain and recover them.”
- @TheRLCThinkers, 2018
This applies to your warfighting formation as well as the logistics and supplies required to support it.
The formation the British Army needs, being headquartered on an Island, requires adequate transportation to deliver it into a region, in sufficient mass to be immediately combat effective and with sufficient throughput to sustain combat operations.
This delivery method may be via amphibious assault (a catch all term for ad-hoc delivery to shore, with varying degrees of contestation), or via a friendly port.
Challenger 2 deploying from LCU Mk 10
Challenger 2 deploying from an LCU Mk 10 to a beach during an Amphibious Assault exercise.
Once in the region, the formation again requires adequate transportation to bring it into theatre in sufficient mass where it can begin manoeuvres and manoeuvre into contact with the enemy.
Once in theatre, the formation requires adequate and appropriate resupply for the duration it is intended to operate.
In order to reduce the burden of the cost of deployment and resupply, the british Army requires a formation with reduced maintenance and supply requirements. Such a requirement can be fulfilled with harmonised vehicles across the formation, examples including using variants of the same vehicles for the majority of all-arms roles or using vehicles with common systems such as engines.
Neither of these approaches are new - the British Army used to use the same engines across armour and logistics fleets - however the lessons appear to have been forgotten following the Peace Dividend after 1993 and the Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR) that have followed.
Reduced logistics trains can be achieved by distributing and integrating traditionally Divisional level maintenance and resupply elements into the formation itself, manouvreing with, being protected by and available to the overall formation immediately, provisioned for the expected operational manoeuvres.
Separate protected resupply formations can then make contact with the combat formations - remember that there is no safe “rear area” expected any more.
I talk about Cyber in a different manner here to the accepted norm (or how I talk about Cyber elsewhere) because I want to focus on the critical impact on the battlefield.
Weapons vs C2/C4
It is accepted that the jamming of communications, the hijacking of drones, co-opting GPS, blinding of sensors and disabling of systems and other Electronic Warfare (EW) will occur on both sides.
This is the weaponised side of Electronic/Cyber warfare.
Where Cyber impacts British Army formations hardest in the field is at the core level of Command and Control (C2). The ability to identify, distinguish, communicate, authenticate and coordinate. C4ISR is at the heart of everything we do.
Command structures and soldiering skills
Montcalm (2018) discusses the concern in the US Army of over reliance on technology to connect the personnel in the field with decision makers a vast distance away. Lt. Gen. Deptula referred to this memorably as “Mother may I” decision making and flagged it as one of the greatest dangers to US and NATO forces ability to not just react, but to act on the battlefield (Subcommittee on AirLand, 2017).
“What happens when the wires are cut?”
- Senator A. King, 2017
McMaster (2014) and McGregor (2017) in particular have successfully lobbied for money to be spent in the US to tackle this by moving more decision making to the point where the information is held - the units on the battlefield.
This has worked spectacularly in the US Navy (Marquet, 2013) at the department level on a warship - specifically a nuclear submarine in the referenced publication - and the newly formed Multi-Domain Task Force has been formed to develop suitable command models outside of the current Army structure.
The US is clearly backtracking to an appropriate point of divergence and redeveloping suitable command structures. It is very important that the British Army does does not follow the US down the wrong path.
Fortunately the Army has at least two highly appropriate models that it is using or developing in practice right now.
The first has been highlighted by Burke (2015) in a report on the soldiering skills that the Royal Marines had been asked to pass on to the US Marine Corps during Officer Exchanges. Amongst these soldiering skills are core, bread and butter, effective, combat proven, command and control techniques that can be relied on down the individual soldier.
“[The Royal Marines] are more focused on their actual soldiering and not so much getting all wrapped up in technology.”
- U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. Christopher Sevigny, 2015
Not only should these skills be clung to with clawed fingers and only prised from a Commando or Paras cold, dead fingers (good luck…) but these Allied exchanges should also be sustained.
We also do not hear of many exchanges between the British services. These should also continue, increase and be promoted/publicised more.
The Army should invite and join with the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force in the development of skills and equipment procurement to avoid reinventing the wheel or losing out on valuable skills. The services must become more receptive to each others developments and experiences.
For example, before procuring a new communication system, has the Army considered equipment and systems available to to the RN and RAF? Will the Navy’s satellite terminals - tough, rugged, operable on the move - be suitable for a Brigade level HQ? RAF pilots operate alone when not emitting, or have access to low probability of intercept communications such as Multifunction Advanced Data Link (MADL) between stealth aircraft. Are these techniques or altered versions of MADL applicable to the crews of upcoming MIV vehicles having to coordinate between each other at distance in a Squadron?
This exchange happens informally, the Army (and the Sister Services) needs to develop a more formal group.
Stryker C2 / MCOTM
A temporary meeting of rapidly movable Stryker C2 vehicles. C2/C4ISR nodes need to be distributed, blend in with other vehicles, be used in a manner where they are not gathered in large numbers and that can disperse at only a handful of minutes notice. Do the other services have operating models and equipment that can help?
The formation the Army needs requires a command structure that is more resilient to Cyber effects than today and that provides faster decision making and quicker, more reliable dissemination of information. It needs to rely less on PowerPoints, more on coming together with maps and paper in the field, dispersing and trusting subordinates command judgment, re-learning when to emit.
The second model that the UK is actively involvement with is the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), a Franco-British military force formalised following the Lancaster House Treaty.
This organisation should not be underestimated.
Aside from the direct military applications, not only does it study the political and military decision making in both countries and tackle the expedititing of forces (MOD and JFS, 2012) but it also exposes the British Army to direct experience of the French organisation of “Sous-Groupement Tactique Interarmes” or SGTIA’s (Wavell Room, 2017).
This approximately Company-level (200 men, 4 platoons) comprises armour, infantry, artillery, logistics and command with - at this level of operation - a C2 function blending Armoured Infantry and Artillery commands at the “small unit” level that has been considered highly effective in delivering success over a huge area of operations during Operation SERVAL.
Keep this small, self-contained, decision-making formation in mind moving forward: Armour, infantry, artillery, logistics and command.
Rules of Engagement
A very quick note on ROE as it lies far outside the scope of this article. ROE has a large impact on C2: Does the soldier stand by and allow an atrocity to be committed in front of them? Will HQ back a soldiers decision to trust their highly trained judgment and engage a threat, even if it turns out later that the situation was not as perceived?
ROE’s, personnel protections and the scale of deployment are interconnected. Humanitarian deployments or the attaching Regiment or smaller units in support of international peacekeeping efforts is one level. However once larger HQ formations start to be considered for deployment the Army needs to be firm that the nature of the level of Command has changed, that experienced decision makers are about to enter the theatre, decisions have moved closer to the information, and the decisions may not be liked by politicians. Nontheless, protections must remain: Eyes wide open decisions.
“The Army is a broad sword, not a scalpel. Trust me, senator - you do not want the Army in an American city.”
- Maj. Gen. Devereaux played by Bruce Willis, The Siege, 1998.
Recce in Force
A tracked main battle tank leads a 4x4 armoured reconnaissance car and two 8x8 Infantry Fighting Vehicles across a bridge for a reconnaissance in force during Anglo-French Exercise Griffin Strike, 2016.
As described in Part I, the Strategic Defence and Security Review almost a decade ago (HMG, 2010) identified that the majority of British Army requirements were best served by Brigade level formations.
However subsequently, General Nick Carter and assorted publications have also identified the need for a “Warfighting Division” capable of High Intensity warfare in support of NATO and Allies.
1st Armored Division entering Iraq during operation Desert Storm ground offensive, 1991.
The largest hurdle to supporting both of these requirements, as evidenced with the structural and equipment shifts during much of the 2000’s, is that the British Army only has the resources to support either:
- A traditional Warfighting Division as last seen during 2003; or
- A traditional Intervention force as we’ve seen in Afghanistan. Not both.
The key word here is traditional.
The British Army requires a Lego like formation that provides the Brigade level forces that the UK needs for itself, but that can be combined with each other - or Brigades from Allies - into one or more Division-like formations.
The formation needs to consume no more personnel or monetary resources than now, but achieve more than traditional formations can.
This is possible through equipment harmonisation throughout the formation (e.g. ruthless commonality in vehicles) more responsive command structures, self-containing all-arms / logistics / command elements organically within the formation and adopting a sympathetic organisation that plugs in with our Allies organisations.
A Generic Vehicle/Base Architecture for C4ISR if you will.
That also means distributing traditional Divisional Assets such as C4ISR, Artillery and Logistics amongst the formations in a more integrated fashion than we currently do with attachments.
Now we have looked at the problems the British Army faces in Part I and covered some of the requirements to overcome them here in Part II, in Part III we will move onto look at the kind of lego-like Brigade structures that are being researched and developed right now that may resolve the Divisional Paradox and provide the British Army with a force structure for the future without breaking the cash-strapped bank.
Please stand by.
Posts in this series
Brown, G. (2017). The Army’s Identity Crisis. Retrieved from https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Winter_2016-17/4_Brown.pdf
Burke, M. M. (2015). British Royal Marine first to embed with US Marines in new program. Retrieved from https://www.stripes.com/news/british-royal-marine-first-to-embed-with-us-marines-in-new-program-1.363356
Deptula, D. Lt. Gen, USAF (Ret). (2017). The Future of All Arms Warfare in the 21st Century. Retrieved from https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Deptula_03-15-17.pdf
Her Majesty’s Government. (2010). Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62482/strategic-defence-security-review.pdf
Macgregor, D. Col (Ret). (2016). A Competitive Performance Analysis: Current and Alternative Force Designs against Russian Forces. Retrieved from http://www.douglasmacgregor.com/RSGSASCBRIEFFINALshow.ppsx
Macgregor, D. Col. (2017). Information Briefing on the Reconnaissance Strike Group (RSG). Retrieved from http://douglasmacgregor.com/rsgupdated12052017.pdf
Marquet, D. Capt. (2013). Turn the Ship Around!: A True Story of Turning Followers into Leaders. Portfolio.
McMaster, H.R. Lt. Gen. (2014). Thinking Clearly about War and the Future of Warfare. Retrieved from https://www.iiss.org/en/militarybalanceblog/blogsections/2014-3bea/october-831b/thinking-clearly-about-war-and-the-future-of-warfare-6183
Ministry of Defence. (2017). Future Operating Environment 2035. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/future-operating-environment-2035
Ministry of Defence and French Joint Staff. (2010). Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) User Guide. Retrieved from http://www.cicde.defense.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/20121218_np_cicde_dcdc_cjef-user-guide.pdf
Montcalm, R. Maj. (2018). A New Dependency: Our Addiction to Information and Approval are Killing Mission Command. Retrieved from https://mwi.usma.edu/new-dependency-addiction-information-approval-killing-mission-command/
Mulvaney, Brendan S. (2012). Strengthened Through the Challenge. Retrieved from http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/138/Docs/PL/PLU/Mulvaney.pdf
Nance, B. Maj. (2017). The US Army’s High-Intensity Problem. Retrieved from https://mwi.usma.edu/us-armys-high-intensity-problem/
Scharre, P. (2017). Future of All Arms Warfare in the 21st Century. Retrieved from https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Scharre_03-15-17.pdf
The RLC Thinkers. (2018). Twitter comment on Operation CABRIT news. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/TheRLCThinkers/status/952958599172706305
Think Defence Blog. (2016). Reflections on Operations in the Balkans. Retrieved from https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/british-army-medium-weight-capability/change-comes-to-the-us-and-uk-land-forces/
Think Defence Blog. (2017). Unmanned Logistics – Last Mile or First Mile. Retrieved from https://uklandpower.com/2017/12/01/unmanned-logistics-last-mile-or-first-mile/
United States Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on AirLand. (2017). All Arms Warfare in the 21st Century. Video retrieved from https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/17-03-15-all-arms-warfare-in-the-21st-century
Wavell Room. (2017). The French intervention in Mali: A lesson in Mission Command. Retrieved from https://wavellroom.com/2017/11/30/the-french-intervention-in-mali-a-lesson-in-mission-command/
Wavell Room. (2017). Future Deployable Headquarters – Small, Distributed & Dislocated. Retrieved from https://wavellroom.com/2017/05/19/future-deployable-headquarters-small-distributed-dislocated/